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COMMENT
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA-A STRICT
SCRUTINY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In equal protection jurisprudence, the general rule is that gov-
ernment actions employing explicit racial and ethnic classifications
are strictly scrutinized.' An exception is invoked if government's
purpose in enacting such programs can be characterized as "be-
nign," in which case a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny is ap-
plied. However, the exception applies only if Congress is the gov-
ernmental actor.2 For example, when a state or local government
favors minority businesses in awarding construction contracts, strict
scrutiny is applied. But if the state or local government is simply a
"disbursing agent" for the federal government, then the program is
subject to a relaxed degree of scrutiny?
This was the state of equal protection analysis in the affirma-
tive action4 arena until June of 1995. In Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,5 the Supreme Court simplified its analysis consider-
ably, holding that all racial classifications must be strictly scruti-
1. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 423-24 (7th
Cir.) (affirming the district court judge's distinction between a state program and the
state's disbursement of funds pursuant to a federal program, applying intermediate scrutiny
to the latter), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
4. Government's most common uses of racial classifications for benevolent purposes
are popularly referred to as "affirmative action" programs. Affirmative action has been
defined as "preferences [designed] to redress perceived inequalities in economic and social
life." Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmen-
tation of Theory After Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 17 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 317, 317 (1992).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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nized.' The Court's new standard for equal protection analysis
applies whether government's purpose in enacting legislation may
be characterized as benevolent, malevolent, or otherwise, and
whether it is Congress or a local school board enacting and admin-
istering the program.7
Part II of this Comment reviews the landmark Supreme Court
cases and opinions leading to the convoluted equal protection anal-
ysis of affirmative action programs prior to Adarand. Part M re-
views Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Adarand, as
well as the opinions of the concurring and dissenting justices. Part
IV analyzes the doctrinal arguments underlying the affirmative
action debate, supporting Adarand's recognition that the right to
equal protection of the law belongs to the individual, and that
classifications based on race should be exceedingly difficult to
justify. Part V applauds Adarand's rejection of the idea that gov-
ernment has an important interest in bringing about diversity, as
well as the misconception that benign governmental intent is readi-
ly identifiable. Finally, part VI concludes that the Court's decision
in Adarand should be viewed not as an end for legitimate affirma-
tive action programs, but rather as a positive step toward govern-
mental decisionmaking in which race itself is not a factor.
II. THE PATH TO ADARAND: LANDMARK AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CASES
To appreciate the impact of Adarand on equal protection anal-
ysis of affirmative action programs, it is necessary to understand
the development of that analysis through prior case law. The fol-
lowing landmark cases outline the progression of the Supreme
Court's affirmative action analytical framework prior to Adarand.
A. Bakke and the Argument for Strict Scrutiny
of Affirmative Action
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' the Su-
preme Court considered a white male applicant's challenge to a
special admissions program at the Medical School of the University
6. Id. at 2113.
7. Id. at 2111 (concluding that "any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
[must] justify any racial classification . . . under the strictest judicial scrutiny").
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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of California at Davis.9 Allan Bakke, whose application for admis-
sion to the medical school was twice rejected, charged that the
effect of Davis's admissions program favoring minority candidates
was to exclude him from the school on the basis of race,'0 in vio-
lation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
After finding the scope of Title VI to be coextensive with that
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 Justice Powell addressed the
question of the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to Davis's
special admission program, which he initially characterized as "a
line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status. ' 4 For Powell,
the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, including the
right to equal protection of the law, were personal rights guaran-
teed to the individual. 5 His plurality opinion stated, "The guaran-
tee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.""6 Accordingly, any distinction based on race or ethnicity
must be subjected to the "most exacting judicial examination."' 7
Although Powell believed that the State, and thus Davis, had
an important interest in ameliorating the effects of past discrimina-
tion, the interest was not sufficiently compelling to intrude on the
rights of an individual absent "judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations."'" Thus, the Da-
vis program was unconstitutional insofar as it disadvantaged irno-
9. Id. at 277-78.
10. In 1973 and 1974, the years when Bakke's applications were rejected, the total
size of the class was 100, but 16 of the seats were allocated through a special admissions
process reserved for members of certain minority groups. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75. The
record showed that in each of the years when Bakke was rejected by Davis, the grade
point averages and entrance exam scores of the students admitted under the special pro-
gram were significantly lower than those of Bakke and others rejected under the regular
admissions program. Id. at 277 n.7. Thus, Bakke argued that he was denied admission
solely on the basis of his race. Id. at 277-78.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
14. Id. at 289. Justice Powell noted summarily the squabble between the parties over
whether the Davis program should be characterized as a "goal" or a "quota," but dis-
missed the semantical distinction as "beside the point." Id. at 288-89 & n.26.
15. Id. at 289.
16. Id. at 289-90.
17. Id. at 291.
18. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-09.
1995)
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cent individuals for purposes of eliminating general "societal dis-
crimination."' 9 Nevertheless, Justice Powell believed that Davis, as
an institution of higher learning, did have a compelling First
Amendment interest in developing a diversified student body, and
could consider race or ethnicity as one factor among many in the
admissions process." While Davis's racial quota program was not
narrowly tailored toward its goal of student diversity, a program
such as Harvard's, in which race or ethnicity was a single factor
tending to tip the admissions balance in favor of a minority appli-
cant, might survive strict judicial scrutiny.2'
Four justices concurred in the Court's judgment only insofar
as it affirmed the order of the California Supreme Court, which
allowed Bakke's admission to the school.' Justice Stevens, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, pre-
ferred to affirm the state court on the narrower basis that Davis
had violated Bakke's rights under Title VI by excluding him be-
cause of his race, thus avoiding the broader constitutional issue of
whether race may be considered in the admissions process.'
Finally, four justices agreed with Justice Powell insofar as he
concluded that Davis was not entirely precluded by the Constitution
from considering race in its admissions process, but otherwise took
issue with his standard of analysis and conclusions.24 Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, reject-
ed the fundamental principle implicit in Justice Powell's opinion
"that the Constitution must be colorblind," instead concluding
that remedial racial classifications need only be substantially related
to the achievement of important governmental objectives.2' Ac-
knowledging that the Court's equal protection jurisprudence had
firmly established the practice of strictly scrutinizing governments'
use of suspect classifications, Justice Brennan framed the "classifi-
cation" element in terms of the group that was singled out and
19. Id. at 310.
20. Id. at 311-14.
21. Id. at 316-18.
22. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-10, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
23. Id. at 411, 421.
24. Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
25. Id. at 336 (referring to Justice Harlan's often quoted assertion from Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
26. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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disadvantaged by the classification.27 Thus, the debate between
Justice Powell and Justice Brennan in Bakke is often distilled to
the fundamental issue over whether the right to equal protection of
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment is an individual right or
a group right." Perhaps' Justice Blackmun best summarized the
latter position: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race .... And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy."29
B. Distinguishing Fullilove: Croson and Strict Scrutiny of State
Affirmative Action Legislation
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,3" a majority of the
Court finally settled on strict scrutiny as the standard of judicial
review for all racial classifications, including affirmative action
legislation." The Court reviewed an equal protection challenge to
an affirmative action plan adopted by the City of Richmond, Vir-
ginia.32 Richmond's plan required construction contractors awarded
city projects to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract
value to minority businesses,33 unless a waiver was sought, in
which case the contractor would have to show that qualified minor-
ity subcontractors were not available.34 After J.A. Croson Compa-
27. See 1d. at 357. Justice Brennan noted that "whites as a class [do not] have any of
the 'traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."' Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
28. See infra part IV.A.
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall characterized Justice Powell's analysis as "substituting abstract equality for
the genuine equality the Amendment was intended to achieve." Id. at 398.
30. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
31. See id. at 494 (finding that the standard of review in equal protection cases "is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification").
Part II.A of Justice O'Connor's opinion was not for the Court, but was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy. Id. at 476. Justice Scalia was the fifth
justice advocating strict scrutiny of all racial classifications. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
32. Id. at 477-86.
33. The Richmond plan considered Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo,
and Aleutian U.S. citizens to be "minority group members," and a minority business was
considered to be one owned and controlled by at least 51% minority group members. Id.
at 478.
34. Id. at 478-79.
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ny was denied a waiver, and subsequently lost a city project when
it tried and failed to meet the city's minority subcontractor require-
ments, Croson filed suit in district court alleging that Richmond's
plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.35
1. Distinguishing Fullilove
Justice O'Connor, joined in part II of her opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, first sought to distinguish the
Court's decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick.36 In Fullilove, the Court
considered a federal affirmative action plan nearly identical to
Richmond's plan in Croson.37 In upholding the federal plan, Chief
Justice Burger's opinion emphasized special deference to
Congress's broad remedial powers under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment in enacting legislation to enforce its provi-
sions.38 Thus, Congress's generalized findings of historical dis-
crimination against minority-owned businesses in the construction
industry were enough to justify exercise of its section 5 remedial
powers to ensure that federal grants to state and local governments
were not used to perpetuate the discrimination.39
Justice Powell recognized that the set-aside in Fullilove was a
"quota" supported only by generalized findings of past discrimina-
tion in the industry as a whole, and thus was not much different
than the Davis plan overturned in Bakke.' Nevertheless, Powell
35. Id. at 481-83.
36. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
37. In fact, the Richmond affirmative action plan appears to have been modeled on the
minority business enterprise (MBE) provision found constitutional in Fullilove. The MBE
provision in that case required that at least 10% of the amount of each grant under the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 be expended for "minority business enterprise[s]."
Id. at 453-54. Furthermore, minority businesses were considered to be businesses owned
by at least 51% minority group members, which were defined the same as in the Rich-
mond plan adopted several years later. Id. at 454; see also supra notes 33-34 and accom-
panying text.
38. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[tihe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
39. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478. Chief Justice Burger explicitly refused to adopt either
strict scrutiny analysis or intermediate scrutiny analysis as articulated in the various Bakke
opinions. Id. at 492. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and
Powell, id. at 453, purported to conduct "a most searching examination" of the legislation
at issue. Id. at 491. Justice Powell, while concurring with Burger in upholding the federal
MBE provision, re-emphasized his adherence to the standard of strict scrutiny he had
articulated in Bakke. Id. at 496. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, the other three
justices concurring in the Court's judgment, applied the standard of intermediate scrutiny
they had articulated in Bakke. Id. at 519.
40. Id. at 505; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that 16 out of
[Vol. 46:279
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agreed that the federal MBE provision was constitutional, although
not perhaps the most narrowly tailored, distinguishing Bakke in
dicta: "The degree of specificity required in the findings of dis-
crimination and the breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies
may vary with the nature and authority of a governmental
body." 4'
Justice O'Connor seized upon Congress's section 5 "specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment" as a means of distinguishing the plan upheld in
Fullilove from the city of Richmond's plan before the Court in
Croson.42 Thus, while generalized findings by Congress of histori-
cal discrimination were sufficient to justify Congress's use of racial
classifications in remedial legislation, the city of Richmond was
required to particularize its findings of private discrimination, es-
sentially showing that it had been "a 'passive participant' in a
system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local con-
struction industry."'43
100 University of California at Davis Medical School seats were reserved for minority
applicants). An advocate on behalf of the government in Fullilove has more recently ar-
gued that the MBE provision at issue in that case was enacted into law without any
Congressional hearings, and that the Court applied a standard of scrutiny falling well
below those which the various members of the majority purportedly applied. Drew S.
Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 465, 467 (1987). Curiously, Mr. Days represented
the government again in Adarand. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2101 (1995), see also Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for
a Heavyweight, 69 TEx. L. REv. 125, 136-41 (1990) (discussing the lack of FCC support
and Congressional fact-finding for the two programs at issue in Metro).
41. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 515 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also noted
that the Court could not review the federal MBE provision "without explicit recognition
that we are reviewing an Act of Congress." Id. at 499. "Unlike the Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, Congress properly may-and indeed must-address directly the prob-
lems of discrimination in our society" Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964)). Thus, while Justice Powell purported to apply strict
scrutiny in Fullilove, id. at 496, in reality the standard he applied fell well below tradi-
tional strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310
(1977) (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (concluding that the
Davis program was unconstitutional insofar as it was addressed solely to remedying the
general effects of "societal discrimination"); supra note 40.
42. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989). In adopting the
state and local versus federal distinction enunciated by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell in Fullilove, Justice O'Connor was joined in part II of her opinion only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. Id. at 476. Justice Kennedy explicitly declined to
join with O'Connor in drawing the Equal Protection Clause line between state and federal
remedial legislation. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
43. Id. at 492.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action Legislation
Fullilove thus distinguished, O'Connor adopted strict scrutiny
as the standard of judicial review for all racial classifications, in-
cluding so-called "benign" or "remedial" classifications." In ap-
plying strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy.45 Justice Scalia agreed
with the four justices that strict scrutiny should be applied to all
racial classifications, benign or otherwise, although he declined to
join in O'Connor's opinion because he did not believe that reme-
dying the effects of past discrimination could ever justify
government's use of racial classifications.'
Justice O'Connor grounded her reasoning in the proposition
set forth by Justice Powell in Bakke,47 that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees rights to the individual, and not to any particular
racial group.' Furthermore, insulating legislation from strict judi-
cial scrutiny by classifying it a priori as benign would undermine
courts' ability to identify illegitimate uses of race.49 Finally,
O'Connor justified strict scrutiny of remedial legislation by noting
that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
44. Id. at 493-94.
45. Id. at 476.
46. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). It was Justice Scalia's belief
that although remedying the effects of identified discrimination might justify race-neutral
government action, it would not justify a government's explicit use of racial classifica-
tions. Id. at 526.
47. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
49. See id. Justice O'Connor stated,
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based mea-
sures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign"
or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of
strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool.
Id. For example, O'Connor noted that Richmond's population was approximately 50%
black, and that five of the nine city council members were black. Id. at 495. Thus, Jus-
tice O'Connor felt that "[tihe concern that a political majority will more easily act to the
disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would
seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this
case." Id. at 495-96.
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politics of racial hostility."'5
The Court in Croson held that there was no showing of past
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.' Further-
more, the Court found the city's statistical evidence of discrimi-
nation in its local construction industry irrelevant and mislead-
ing. 2 Finally, congressional findings of nationwide discrimination
in the construction industry could not justify Richmond's use of
remedial racial classifications and the underlying assumption that
discrimination existed in the Richmond construction trade. 3
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun adhered to the same
view in Croson that they had expressed in Bakke," that "race-con-
scious classifications designed to further remedial goals 'must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny." ' Justice Marshall believed that remedial racial
classifications should not be subjected to the Court's traditional
strict level of judicial scrutiny, which he had characterized in
Fullilove as "'scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'56
Applying their "intermediate" level of scrutiny, the dissenting jus-
tices believed that the statistical disparities and the congressional
findings of past nationwide discrimination, which were rejected by
O'Connor,57  were sufficient bases to justify the city of
Richmond's remedial use of racial classifications. 8
50. Id. at 493.
51. Id. at 500.
52. Statistics offered into evidence in Croson showed that while the population of
Richmond was approximately 50% black, in the five-year period extending from 1978 to
1983 only 0.67% of the city's prime construction contracts were awarded to minority-
owned businesses. Id. at 479-80. As evidence of past discrimination it was also shown
that local construction trade associations had virtually no minority members. Id. at 480.
Justice O'Connor found such statistics irrelevant absent evidence of the number of minori-
ties qualified to participate in the industry. Id. at 501-03. However, O'Connor did concede
that in some rare cases a statistically sound disparity such as was offered in Croson
might justify race-conscious remedial legislation. Id. at 509.
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
54. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
55. Croson, 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
dissenting) (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978)).
56. Id. at 552 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 325 (referring to the Court's
choice among standards of review as largely "outcome determinative").
57. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
58. Croson, 488 U.S. at 541-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While the dissenting justices
believed that remedying the effects of general societal discrimination, without specific
findings, was a sufficiently important governmental interest to satisfy their standard of
2871995]
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C. Metro Broadcasting and Reaffirmation of the State-Federal
Distinction
Only one year after its decision in Croson, the Court revisited
the issue of the standard of review to be applied in evaluating
remedial racial classifications in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC.59 The Court reviewed equal protection challenges to two
FCC programs designed to increase the representation of minority
viewpoints in broadcasting by increasing minority ownership of
radio and television broadcast stations.60 In one, the FCC consid-
ered minority ownership6' as a single positive factor among others
in comparative proceedings for new licenses.62 In the other pro-
gram, only approved minority enterprises were eligible to purchase
broadcast licenses from existing broadcasters at "distress sales."'63
In applying a standard of intermediate scrutiny to the FCC
programs, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found it "of
overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority own-
ership programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandat-
ed-by Congress."'  Thus, the Court distinguished its decision in
Croson, which applied strict scrutiny to a benign racial classifica-
review, see id. at 530-32, 540, they also thought that the evidence presented by the city
of Richmond was sufficient to satisfy the majority's standard. Id. at 541. For example,
they thought that Justice O'Connor's unwillingness to consider statistical disparities absent
evidence of the number of qualified minorities was inappropriate, in that past discrintina-
tion may have been the very reason why there was a limited number of qualified minori-
ty group members in the industry. Id. at 542-43.
59. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
60. Id. at 552.
61. Minorities under the FCC programs were considered to be Black, Hispanic Sur-
named, American Eskimo, Aleutian, American Indian, and Asiatic American persons. Id. at
553 n.l.
62. Id. at 556-57. Minority ownership was only dispositive to the extent the minority
owner actively participated in the daly management of the station. Id. at 557.
63. The "distress sale" program was an exception to the FCC's general policy that
prohibited a broadcaster from transferring its license while its qualifications to hold the
license were being investigated. Id. at 557.
64. Metro, 497 U.S. at 563. Justice Brennan's reference was to Congress's enactment
of FCC appropriations legislation that prohibited the FCC from re-examining the two
minority ownership policies at issue in Metro. Id. at 560. The involvement of Congress,
however, was probably not a truly distinguishing factor for Justice Brennan, who had
always argued in favor of intermediate scrutiny for all affirmative action programs. The
purpose of the state-federal distinction was to draw the vote of Justice White, who joined
with Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny opinion in Croson. Charles Fried, Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 126 (1990); see
also Devins, supra note 40, at 128 n.21 (noting Justice White's propensity for showing
deference to Congress).
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tion,' on the basis that the FCC's program was supported by
Congress's institutional competence and Commerce Clause pow-
er.' The Court required only that the FCC programs be substan-
tially related to the achievement of important governmental inter-
ests. The Court also noted that the government's interest need not
be to remedy the effects of past governmental or even societal
discrimination. 7
The FCC's asserted interest was in promoting broadcast diver-
sity,68 which the Court found was a sufficiently important interest
in that it served First Amendment values.69 Second, the Court
found a substantial relationship between the FCC's asserted goal of
broadcast diversity and increased minority ownership of broadcast
stations, the means by which the FCC sought to achieve its
goal." In applying this second prong of its newly-adopted test,
the Court relied primarily on findings and conclusions of the FCC
and Congress, which recited a connection between diversity of
broadcasting and minority ownership.7
Four dissenting justices, consistent with their opinions in
Croson,72 would have applied strict scrutiny to the FCC pro-
grams73 Justice O'Connor lamented the Court's "renewed tolera-
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. Metro, 497 U.S. at 563. Justice Brennan quoted Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Croson for the proposition "that 'Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-
wide discrimination."' Id. at 565 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 490 (1989)). Brennan further noted that Croson could not be read to overrule the
Court's decision in Fullilove. Id.
67. Id. at 564-65.
68. In that the FCC's asserted interest was not remedial, Metro was arguably not a
traditional affirmative action case. See supra note 4 (defining affirmative action).
69. Metro, 497 U.S. at 556-68. The Court compared the FCC's diversity of program-
ming objective to the diversity of ideas interest that Justice Powell, in his Bakke opinion,
thought might justify racial preferences in university admissions decisions. Id. at 568
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978)).
70. Id. at 569.
71. Although the Court claimed that it was not deferring to the FCC and Congress, it
did admit according great weight to their fact finding expertise. Id. at 569. Nevertheless,
the Court's finding that there was a substantial relationship between the FCC's end and
its chosen means appears to have been based almost entirely on the FCC's and
Congress's conclusions to that effect. See id. at 569-79. The Court stated that, "As re-
vealed by the historical evolution of current federal policy, both Congress and the Com-
mission have concluded that the minority ownership programs are critical means of pro-
moting broadcast diversity. We must give great weight to their joint determination." Id. at
579.
72. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy were four of
the five justices in Croson who applied strict scrutiny to a benign racial classification. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
73. Metro, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia and
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tion of racial classifications and . . . repudiation of our recent
affirmation [in Croson] that the Constitution's equal protection
guarantees extend equally to all citizens." 4 A lower level of scru-
tiny should not have been applied to the federal government's use
or approval of a racial classification, the dissent asserted, despite
the Court's decision in Fullilove.5 O'Connor argued that the stan-
dard set forth in Croson should have been applied, distinguishing
Fullilove in that the FCC programs did not implicate Congress's
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Further-
more, O'Connor noted that the Court's decision in Fullilove did
not adopt Justice Marshall's "intermediate" level of scrutiny, and
that application of such a lesser standard was without precedent.'
Justice O'Connor and the three other dissenting justices be-
lieved that the government's purported finding of a connection
between race and ideas was nothing more than an impermissible
stereotype.78 They were similarly concerned about the stigma and
suggestion of inferiority that racial preferences may carry, particu-
larly when unrelated to remedial objectives.79 Finally, the dissent-
ing justices were skeptical about the Court's ability to identify and
separate "benign" discrimination from invidious discrimination, so
that it could determine which degree of judicial scrutiny to ap-
ply."0 Justice Kennedy characterized the Court's decision in Metro
as doing "no more than mov[ing] us from 'separate but equal' to
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
74. Id. at 602.
75. Id. at 604-06.
76. Id. at 605-07. The dissent distinguished Fullilove, in which Congress's powers
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment justified a lower level of judicial scrutiny, on
the basis that § 5 only empowered Congress to oversee the states' adherence to the Four-
teenth Amendment, and Metro involved the administration of federal programs. Id. at 605-
06. Moreover, the dissent believed Fullilove still required that Congress's purpose for use
of racial classifications be remedial in nature. Id. at 607. Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Metro has been criticized as "an extraordinary reversal of her prior position" in Croson,
distinguishing Croson "by narrowing it beyond recognition." Katz, supra note 4, at 337.
77. Metro, 497 U.S. at 608. Although Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny in Fullilove, the lead opinion of Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justices White and Powell, and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, purported to
apply standards of analysis sounding more like strict scrutiny. See supra note 39.
78. Metro, 497 U.S. at 618-19. O'Connor thought that the FCC's means were so unre-
lated to its asserted ends, she suggested that the FCC's true goal was to allocate broad-
cast licenses on the basis of race, a kind of racial balancing, rather than its asserted goal
of broadcast diversity. Id. at 625.
79. Id. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 635.
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'unequal but benign. ''8.
IR. THE CouRT's DECISION IN ADARAND
A. Factual and Procedural Background of the Case
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,82 the Court reviewed
a subcontractor's equal protection challenge to the federal
government's use of racial preferences in subcontractor compensa-
tion clauses." Mountain Gravel & Construction Co. was the prime
contractor on a highway construction project for a division of the
U.S. Department of Transportation. 4 Although Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. was the low bidder for guardrail work on the project,
Gonzales Construction Co., a minority-owned business,85  was
awarded the subcontract. 6 Despite its higher bid, Gonzales was
awarded the subcontract because Mountain's prime contract includ-
ed a clause that increased Mountain's compensation by roughly ten
percent of the subcontract value87 for subcontracts awarded to so-
called Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) like Gonzales.8
A subcontractor was considered a DBE under the government
contract when it was, inter alia, certified as such by the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA). 9 Two different SBA programs
provided that "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals
would be eligible for such subcontractor compensation clauses.'
81. Id. at 638.
82. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
83. Id. at 2102-04.
84. Id. at 2102. The Central Federal Lands Highway Division of the U.S. Department
of Transportation awarded the construction contract to Mountain. Id.
85. More precisely, Gonzales was certified as a business owned and controlled by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."' Id.
86. Id. A Mountain employee admitted that Adarand would have been awarded the
guardrail subcontract absent the subcontractor compensation clause at issue. Id.
87. Mountain Gravel received an additional $10,000 by hiring Gonzales rather than
Adarand for the guardrail work. Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Ponders Racial Set-Aside
Case: New Era or Step Backward?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, at Al, A17.
88. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103-04. The Court's opinion thoroughly examined the
"complex scheme of federal statutes and regulations" that requires such subcontractor
compensation clauses to appear in most federal contracts. Id. at 2102-03. The prime direc-
tive for such federal contract provisions is The Small Business Act, which declares the
federal government's policy of encouraging participation of "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals" in the performance of federal contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1)
(1993).
89. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103-04.
90. See id. at 2102-03. See generally Major Thomas . Hasty, I[[, Minority Business
Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration's 8(A) Program: Past,
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The SBA further presumed that members of certain minority racial
groups were "socially disadvantaged," such that businesses owned
by individuals belonging to minority racial groups were presumed
eligible for subcontractor compensation clauses.9 Individuals be-
longing to other racial groups were required to prove "social disad-
vantage [by] clear and convincing evidence."'
A subcontractor could also qualify as a DBE under the
government's contract with Mountain Gravel if certified as such by
a state or local government agency.93 However, the Secretary of
Transportation's minimum criteria required state agencies to pre-
sume, as with the SBA programs, social and economic disadvan-
tage for certain racial groups.94
Adarand alleged that the subcontractor compensation clause
and the race-based presumptions underlying it violated Adarand's
right to equal protection.95 The United States District Court for
the District of Colorado granted the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment,96 and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed.97 Both courts relied on the federal-state distinction crafted
by the opinions in Fullilove, Croson, and Metro in concluding that
a lower standard of judicial scrutiny applied to congressionally
mandated programs such as those challenged by Adarand."
Present, and (Is There a) Future?, 145 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1994) (thoroughly explaining and
analyzing the Small Business Administration's 8(A) program, one of the challenged pro-
grams in Adarand).
91. Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native American individu-
als were presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2103; 13 C.F.R.
§§ 124.105(b)(1), 124.106(b) (1995); 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994).
92. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103; 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(c) (1995).
93. Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2103-04.
94. Id. at 2103; 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 (1994); 49 C.F.R. pt. 23, subpt. D, App. C (1994).
95. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104.
96. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992).
97. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547 (10th Cir. 1994).
98. See id. at 1543-45 (the Court found no support for "the proposition that a federal
agency must make independent findings to justify the use of a benign race-conscious
program implemented in accordance with federal requirements"); see also Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. at 243 ("The overriding distinction between the
program upheld in Fullilove and the instant program, when compared to the program held
unconstitutional in Croson, is undoubtedly the congressional mandate behind the Fullilove
program and this one.").
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B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion for the Court
After concluding that Adarand had standing to seek an injunc-
tion against the government's future use of race-conscious subcon-
tractor compensation clauses,' the Court addressed the issue of
the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied. Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the Court,"o first reviewed the Court's jurisprudence con-
ceming the extent to which the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause incorporates an equal protection element.'' In a school
desegregation case, the Court had concluded that "it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the federal government."'" The Adarand Court, citing several
other cases expressing similar views, concluded that the Court's
review of a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim should be the
same as if the claim had arisen under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
The Court next reviewed the various opinions expressed in
Bakke,' Fullilove, °5 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion."°s The Court's failure to generate a majority opinion in
those cases caused confusion regarding the proper standard of
scrutiny applicable to remedial government action employing racial
classifications."° While the Court's decision in Croson1°8 had
99. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104-05 (1995).
100. Justice O'Connor's opinion, other than part MI.C, was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. See id. at 2101. The opinion was also
joined by Justice Scalia, except to the extent that it was inconsistent with Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion. See id. Thus, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion must be examined to
determine the extent that Justice O'Connor's opinion was for the Court. Only Justice Ken-
nedy joined part I.C of O'Connor's opinion. See id.
101. The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, does not have an
explicit guarantee of equal protection, providing only that "[n]o person shall be ... de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states, explicitly incorporates an equal
protection guarantee, providing that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
103. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976), and United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987)).
104. See supra part lI.A.
105. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
106. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The opinions expressed in Wygant, involving an affirmative
action racial preference in school layoffs, were similar to those expressed by the various
members of the Court in Bakke. See id.; supra part II.A.
107. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109-10.
108. See supra part lI.B.
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partially resolved the issue by applying strict scrutiny to a city's
allegedly remedial use of racial classifications,"° it did not deter-
mine what level of scrutiny would apply to the federal government
in similar circumstances"' Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor
gleaned three general principles from the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence through and including the answer provided in
Croson."
The first principle was skepticism-that the Court must make
a "'searching examination"' of any classifications based on race or
ethnicity." 2 The second principle was consistency-that "'the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not depen-
dent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular
classification.""' 3 Justice O'Connor's third and final principle was
congruence-that, as discussed in part IH.A of the Court's opin-
ion,"4 Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis of federal gov-
ernment action must be the same as Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection analysis of state and local action."5 From these three
principles and the Court's jurisprudence supporting them, Justice
O'Connor concluded for the Court that "any person, of whatever
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scruti-
ny.""' The Court's reasoning was based on the principle set forth
by Justice Powell in Bakke: the right to equal protection is an
individual and not a group right.' '
The Court rejected its decision in Metro as departure from
precedent." 8 First, Metro ignored Croson's explanation of the
need for strict scrutiny of all racial classifications-that, "absent
109. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
110. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, at 2110.
111. Id. at 2111.
112. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (Powell, J., plu-
rality opinion) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)).
113. Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
114. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
115. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell,
J.)). The Court further stated that its three propositions "all derive from the basic princi-
ple that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not
groups." Id. at 2112.
118. See supra part II.C.
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searching judicial inquiry," it is not always possible to distinguish
between benign and invidious discrimination." 9 Second, Metro
departed from precedent in ignoring the principles of skepticism,
consistency, and congruence, which the Adarand Court gleaned
from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence."' Discussing the
principle of stare decisis, Justice O'Connor framed the Court's
departure from its decision in Metro as a return to finly estab-
lished precedent, rather than as a departure from precedent.'' The
Court held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifi-
cations are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored mea-
sures that further compelling governmental interests."'"
119. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)). Responding to Justice Stevens' dissent, the
Court further noted that even though Congress' intentions may clearly be good, even
Justice Stevens had recognized that
"good intentions" alone are not enough to sustain a supposedly "benign" racial
classification: "[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a
statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assump-
tion that those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in
some respect that is identified purely by their race. Because that percep-
tion-especially when fostered by the Congress of the United States-can only
exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when race
will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor. Unless Congress
clearly articulates the need and basis for a racial classification, and also tailors
the classification to its justification, the Court should not uphold this kind of
statute."
Id. at 2113 (emphasis added) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 2112; see also supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
121. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-15. In support of this argument, Justice O'Connor
insisted that,
Remaining true to an "intrinsically sounder" doctrine established in prior cases
better serves the values of stare decisis than would following a more recently
decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it; the latter
course would simply compound the recent error and would likely make the
unjustified break from previously established doctrine complete.
Id. at 2115. Part ll1.C of Justice O'Connor's opinion, discussing stare decisis, was not for
the Court and was joined only by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2101.
122. Id. at 2113. The Court explicitly overruled Metro to the extent that it was incon-
sistent with its new holding. Id. The Court did not find the statutes at issue unconstitu-
tional, however, but instead remanded the case to the court of appeals for further consid-
eration. The lower court had considered the federal statutes under Metro's standard of
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Id. at 2118. The Court also noted that
Fullilave would no longer be controlling to the extent that it applied a less rigorous stan-
dard of review to the federal government's affirmative action legislation. Id. at 2117.
1995]
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Justice O'Connor's opinion established a new standard for
review of affirmative action legislation only to the extent that it
was not inconsistent with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion."
Justice Scalia agreed that strict scrutiny must be applied to any
governmental use of racial classifications. 24 However, Scalia dis-
agreed with the idea that government could ever have a "compel-
ling" interest in using racial classifications to remedy the effects of
past discrimination."a Scalia believed that "[t]o pursue the con-
cept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign
of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race
hatred.
126
Justice Thomas, who also joined in the Court's opinion, was
primarily concerned about the "racial paternalism" aspect of affir-
mative action legislation:
[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its
unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pemi-
cious as any other form of discrimination. So-called
"benign" discrimination teaches many that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities
cannot compete with them without their patronizing indul-
gence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of
superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the
government's use of race. These programs stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled"
to preferences. '
C. Opinions of the Dissenting Justices
Justice Stevens, in his dissent,'28 first criticized the majority
for its "supposed inability to differentiate between 'invidious' and
'benign' discrimination."'' 29 Second, Stevens criticized the majority
123. See supra note 100.
124. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2119.
127. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
128. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 2120.
129. Id. at 2120-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens viewed the Court's new concept of
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for refusing to recognize a significant difference between affirma-
five action legislation by the federal government and that by state
or local governments.' Congress's institutional competence, its
mandate under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its
powers under the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause, Stevens
argued, all justified deference by the Court to Congress's legislative
decisions.' Addressing the principle of stare decisis, Justice
Stevens viewed the majority's decision as a departure from the
precedent of Fullilove and Metro, which upheld federal affirmative
action programs in deference to Congress, rather than as a return to
precedent. 32
Justice Souter agreed that the Court's decision in Fullilove
applied and noted that Adarand failed to contest the factual find-
ings of discrimination in the construction industry upon which
Fullilove was based. Thus, Justice Souter argued that stare decisis
required the Court to uphold the programs at issue.' Justice
Souter further opined that, as Justice Powell believed the legislation
in Fullilove satisfied strict scrutiny, on remand Adarand's challenge
to Congress's evidentiary findings of past discrimination would
fail. 3
4
Justice Ginsburg emphasized the common thread among a
majority of the Court-the belief that Congress has an interest in
remedying the effects of past discrimination that still infect soci-
ety.Y3 5 Further, Ginsburg noted that the majority's reason for strict
scrutiny of all racial classifications was to "ferret out classifications
consistency in terms of the purpose behind the legislation, whether benign or invidious.
Id. at 2021. The majority, in turn, criticized Stevens for failing to recognize the right to
equal protection as an individual, personal right. Id. at 2114. For the majority consistency
meant that the right to equal protection belongs to all persons equally.
130. Id. at 2122-23.
131. Id. at 2123-26. In support, Justice Stevens referred to the opinions of various
members of the Court in Croson, distinguishing Fullilove on such bases, and in Metro,
distinguishing Croson on such bases. See supra notes 42-43 (discussing Croson), 76-77
(discussing Metro) and accompanying text.
132. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127.
133. Id. at 2131-32 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined in his opinion by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 2131.
134. Id. at 2133-34. Justice Souter did not believe that the majority's opinion adopting
strict scrutiny should or would change the standard of review as applied in Fullilove. Id.
135. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was joined
in her opinion by Justice Breyer. Id. at 2134. Justice Ginsburg cited several studies show-
ing that societal discrimination was still evident in hiring practices, consumer relations,
housing, and business generally. Id. at 2135 & nn.3-6.
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in reality malign, but masquerading as benign,"'" and thus strict
scrutiny should not necessarily be fatal to legitimate affirmative
action programs.'37 Thus, while she agreed with Justice Stevens'
principle of according deference to Congress and the precedential
value of Fullilove,'35 Justice Ginsburg optimistically viewed the
Court's opinion "as one that allows our precedent to evolve, still to
be informed by and responsive to changing conditions."'39
IV. DOCTRINAL VICTORIES IN ADARAND
The debate in Bakke, Fullilove, Croson, Metro, and finally
Adarand over the proper standard of judicial review of affirmative
action legislation has often been viewed as a struggle between two
groups adhering to ideologically opposed, variously defined theo-
ries. The groups are those generally in favor of and those others
generally opposed to affirmative action programs."4 The theories
with which they defend their positions debate both the meaning of
equality and the role of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation.
Thus, the Court's decision in Adarand may be viewed as a choice
between diametrically opposed philosophies and the victory of one
over the other. 4'
136. Id. at 2136.
137. Justice Ginsburg urged that "[tihe divisions in this difficult case should not obscure
the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's acknowl-
edgement of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but
also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects." Id. at 2135 (citations omitted).
138. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
139. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140. Politically, the debate has been framed as one between Democrats and Republicans.
See, e.g., Linda Chavez, Racial Justice: Changing the Tune, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994,
at 18 (opining that it is Democrats who support a theory of "group rights," while Repub-
licans favor an "individual rights" theory of equality). The notion that the Court's decision
in Adarand might be explained along political party lines and with reference to public
opinion may be unsettling and unacceptable to many constitutional law scholars, as well
as members of the Court itself. See James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in
Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1118 (1993) (applauding Justice
Souter's attempt to combine stare decisis with public opinion, while noting that some
constitutional law scholars and some of Justice Souter's colleagues on the Court would
reject such a "fluid vision" of the Constitution). Nevertheless, Professor Wilson has argued
that the Court's opinions and rhetoric do not always fully explain the impetus behind
individual Justices' decisions, and that public opinion plays at least a peripheral role. Id.
at 1135-36.
141. Adarand does not necessarily mean the demise of affirmative action. As an illustra-
tion, while some affirmative action supporters brace themselves for a defense of existing
legislation, others view Adarand as a partial victory in that a firm majority of the Court
expressed the belief that not all race-based remedial legislation are unconstitutional. See
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A. Individual Rights Versus Group Rights
Probably the most fundamental debate sparked by affirmative
action legislation concerns the meaning of equality. It is agreed
that both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee to all persons "equal protection of the laws."'42 Howev-
er, the meaning of equality in society and the role of government
in protecting that liberty has been hotly contested.
The debate over the meaning of equality may be framed loose-
ly as one over whether the Constitution embraces a theory of
"group rights" or a theory of "individual rights."'43 The underly-
ing assumption of the group rights theory is that in the absence of
discrimination, there will be few differences in socio-economic
status among groups. The focus of group rights theory, as the
name suggests, is on improving the social status of minority groups
as a whole.'" It adopts an asymmetrical, "empowerment model,"
in which affirmative steps must be taken to enhance the economic
and social standing of minorities, thereby leveling the playing field
among the races. 45 In doing so, group rights theory identifies in-
dividuals as members of a particular group, and emphasizes the
rights of the group over those of the individual.'" Group rights
theory views affirmative action legislation as a legitimate remedy
generally Sam Skolnik, Ralph Neas' Last Stand?; Activists Gird for Battle After Adarand,
LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 1995, at 16, 19.
142. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1; see also supra notes 101-03 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been inter-
preted by the Court to include a guarantee of equal protection identical to the explicit
guarantee found in the Fourteenth Amendment).
143. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 64, at 108-09 (using similar terms). These phrases will
be adopted herein as perhaps best describing the essential nature of the debate. However,
the same controversy has been described in a multitude of different ways. For example,
the debate has been framed as one between: "liberal individualism" and "collectiv[ism],"
id. at 109; "formal equal opportunity" and "critical race theory," Roy L. Brooks & Mary
Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Dis-
tinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REv. 787, 788-89 (1994); a "rhetoric of
innocence" and a "rhetoric of guilt," Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 15, 15-16 (1991); "backward-looking" relief and "forward-looking" relief, Sheila
Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity,"
1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 107-08 (1993); and an "antidiscrimination principle" and an
"equal results model," id. at 148-49.
144. Katz, supra note 4, at 318.
145. Brooks & Newborn, supra note 143, at 790. It may be more accurate to view
some formulations of the group rights theory as requiring not only that the playing field
be level among the races (as individual rights theory arguably requires as well), but also
that the final score be a tie.
146. Fried, supra note 64, at 109.
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for the continuing effects of past and present societal discrimina-
tion.47
The leading Supreme Court advocates of group rights theory
have been Justices Marshall and Brennan. In Bakke, Justice
Brennan was not so much concerned that Allan Bakke, as an indi-
vidual, was disadvantaged, but rather focused on the fact that
Bakke was white, and thus a member of a class without a history
of unequal treatment." Marshall similarly focused on the group,
rather than the individual, that was disadvantaged by the legislation
at issue in Croson, arguing that strict scrutiny should not have
been applied. 49
In sharp contrast, individual rights theory teaches that funda-
mental rights, such as the right to equal protection of the laws,
belong to the individual, and not by virtue of his or her member-
ship in a group. 5 ° Individuals are responsible for their own ac-
tions, but have no greater obligation to society.'' In short, indi-
vidual rights theory "does not view the existence of discrimination
and social segmentation as a sufficient reason to reproduce [the
same evils] in the coercive apparatus of the state."'52 It views af-
firmative action legislation as "pernicious discrimination."'53
Equality, according to individual rights theorists, means that the
Constitution must be "colorblind."' 54 In other words, "the law
must treat all groups, including historically excluded groups, with-
out reference to race or color."'55 Individuals must be evaluated
not with reference to their membership in some group, but rather
on the basis of their individual merit. As one author suggested, it
may be appropriate in some circumstances to define merit on the
basis of relative rather than absolute standards, emphasizing efforts
147. Devins, supra note 143, at 18 (referring to the group rights theory as the "guilt
model").
148. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 25-29 and ac-
companying text.
149. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the "Court has never held that numerical inferiority, standing alone, makes a
racial group 'suspect' and thus entitled to strict scrutiny review").
150. Fried, supra note 64, at 108.
151. Katz, supra note 4, at 318.
152. Fried, supra note 64, at 109.
153. Devins, supra note 143, at 18.
154. See, e.g., Days, supra note 40, at 470 (noting that the goal of a "color-blind
Constitution" has been "honored more in the breach than in observance").
155. Brooks & Newborn, supra note 143, at 795.
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rather than results. 6 In other words, merit may consider "how
well individuals have done given their starting places, 15 7 and yet
not run afoul of the primacy of the individual. As Professor Morri-
son suggests, it is not necessary to adhere to absolute standards of
merit to avoid making group-based inquiries. 158 Nevertheless,
while an individual rights theorist might examine the starting place
of an individual, or the diversity overcome along the way, in eval-
uating merit, the individual's starting place would not be viewed as
being born black, white, Croatian, or otherwise.
Justice Powell focused on equality as an individual right in
Bakke.'59 In Justice O'Connor's Croson, Metro, and Adarand
opinions, she has more recently adhered to the same view of equal
protection as an individual right."W In Justice O'Connor's opinion
the. only valid justification for departing from this principle and
permitting explicit governmental use of racial classifications, would
be remedying the effects of past governmental discrimination.'
Justice Scalia's position, that race may never legitimately be a
factor in governmental decision making, 62 is perhaps more doc-
trinally pure than Justice O'Connor's position.'63 However, insofar
as it is entirely consistent with individual rights theory to argue
that individuals deserve to be compensated for identifiable harms
suffered at the hands of government,'" Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach to individual rights theory is perhaps more doctrinally
sound. Therefore, despite the lack of support for Justice Scalia's
156. John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 332 (1994).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 336 (asserting the contested point).
159. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
160. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (1995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989).
161. See Metro, 497 U.S. at 612-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
163. Justice Scalia's approach to individual rights theory may be viewed as a polar con-
trast to the group rights theory. See, e.g., David Cole, 'Hoop Dreams' and Colorblindness,
LEGAL TmEs, Jan. 23, 1995, at 43 (asserting that the Court's approach to affirmative
action legislation "is much closer to Justice Scalia's point of view than to Justice
Marshall's").
164. See Devins, supra note 143, at 32 (arguing that "[riace-dependent decision mak-
ing .. . cannot be rejected out of hand as inconsistent with the antidiscrimination princi-
ple [insofar as] [clompensatory justice demands that an individual wronged by pernicious
discrimination be entitled to compensation adequate to remedy the wrong suffered").
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perhaps purer doctrinal approach, a solid majority of the Court has
signalled its approval of the individual rights theorists' conception
of equality.
B. The Rationality Model Versus the Historical Model
A second debate, reaching at least peripherally the broader
issue of the proper role of the judiciary in constitutional interpreta-
tion, underlies the affirmative action controversy. At its simplest, it
is a debate over the standard of judicial review-strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny-applicable to government's supposedly be-
nign use of racial classifications. More fundamentally, however, it
is a debate over the extent that the judiciary should invade the
province of the legislature (and especially the Court's co-equal
branch, Congress) in guarding constitutional liberties.
The position of those opposed to affirmative action has been
relatively straightforward. In the equal protection context, it is
recognized that government must routinely engage in line drawing
on the basis of various characteristics to achieve acceptable, legiti-
mate, and even desirable goals.'6 The rationality model examines
the likelihood that a particular classification will bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate government end.'" If the likelihood is
high, as with economic legislation, the Court largely defers to
legislative decisionmaking. 67 However, when government uses
race as a proxy, it is presumed that government has acted irration-
ally and illegitimately, 6 ' and the legislation or program at issue
is carefully scrutinized. Underlying this theory is the
antidiscrimination principle, which counsels against drawing lines
on the basis of race except in extremely limited circumstances.'69
In the abstract, allocating burdens and benefits on the basis of race
is presumptively wrong and is presumed to bear no rational rela-
tion to a legitimate government purpose.
In contrast to the rationality model, the historical model looks
beyond the government's explicit use of a racial classification,
examining whether the group(s) disadvantaged by the classification
have been subjected to a history of discrimination or excluded
from the political process by reason of immutable and irrelevant
165. Katz, supra note 4, at 323.
166. Id. at 326.
167. Id. at 324.
168. Id. at 326.
169. Devins, supra note 143, at 27.
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characteristics.'7 The historical model may be viewed as a modi-
fication of the pure rationality model. Government's use of racial
classifications is presumed to be irrational and illegitimate, but only
so long as history has shown that government might be inclined to
discriminate against the disadvantaged groups.
An interrelated theory that has drawn the support of those in
favor of affirmative action programs is the separation of functions
principle.' Separation of functions commands deference to legis-
lative decisionmaking and the majoritarian process in drawing
distinctions among persons," and in that respect it is an underly-
ing basis from which the rationality model proceeds. However,
separation of functions theory departs from the pure rationality
model and the antidiscrimination principle in examining the politi-
cal process underlying the government's racial classification. If the
disadvantaged groups are the groups controlling the political pro-
cess, the theory goes, they have disadvantaged themselves for a
greater good and the reasons for being suspicious of their use of a
racial classification do not exist.73 Separation of functions is sim-
ilar to the historical model in its focus on the characteristics of the
disadvantaged group, and as a justification for a lesser judicial
inquiry than traditional strict scrutiny. It differs in its focus on the
disadvantaged group's ability to participate in the political process
rather than the disadvantaged group's having been subject to a
historical pattern of invidious discrimination, although the latter
may very likely have been a cause of the former.
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion reflected the rationality model's
conclusion that all classifications based on race must be strictly
scrutinized.'74 Justice O'Connor's principle of skepticism dis-
cussed in Adarand reflected a similar sentiment, concluding that all
racial classifications are immediately suspect."' O'Connor's sec-
ond general principle in Adarand, consistency, rejected both the
historical model and the separation of functions principle in one
broad stroke. She summarily dismissed any theory that varied the
standard of review based on the race of those advantaged or disad-
170. Katz, supra note 4, at 326.
171. Devins, supra note 143, at 22.
172. Id. at 23-24.
173. Devins, supra note 40, at 143.
174. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
175. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
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vantaged by the racial classification at issue. 76 On the flip side,
as might be expected, Justice Brennan's opinions have relied on
the historical model. In Bakke, for example, Brennan argued that
the Davis program should not have been strictly scrutinized when
it was the class of whites, who had not been subjected to a history
of racial discrimination, who were disadvantaged by the Davis
program.'M
The rationality model and the antidiscrimination principle have
been criticized as inconsistent with the original impetus behind
multi-level judicial scrutiny-invidious discrimination against
blacks.'
Under the three-tiered analysis applied by the Court, affir-
mative action for women should be subject to intermediate
scrutiny, and affirmative action for others to minimum
scrutiny. The result is that affirmative action programs that
benefit women are easier to defend under the equal protec-
tion clause than identical programs that benefit African
Americans or Hispanics.
19
A purely theoretical problem with this critique is that it reverts
to the historical model's underlying assumptions in analyzing the
results under the rationality model. Nevertheless, it does require an
explanation as to the disparate effects resulting from application of
the rationality model in the affirmative action arena. The lower
level of scrutiny for gender classifications is perhaps best explained
by the antidiscrimination principle underlying the rationality model.
Discrimination on the basis of race is inherently wrong, generally
irrelevant to legitimate government goals, and justified only in
extremely limited circumstances. 8 As the right to equal protec-
tion belongs to the individual, and not by virtue of his or her
membership in a group,'' the rule applies without reference to
the race of those advantaged and disadvantaged by a particular
classification. Classifications based on gender, on the other hand,
are more likely to be rationally related to a legitimate government
176. Id.; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
177. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
178. Katz, supra note 4, at 340 (citing Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
735 F. Supp. 1274, 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
179. Id. at 339.
180. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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end, and are therefore scrutinized less carefully."
The problem with the historical model is that it permits courts
to determine whether governmental actions discriminate against
minorities before applying any level of scrutiny. It allows courts
to scrutinize less carefully explicit racial classifications which are
not facially disadvantageous to minorities. It affords less than
equal protection to individuals who, although not members of a
historically repressed class, may have been entirely excluded from
the political process. Moreover, as Justice O'Connor's recent opin-
ions explain, with racial classifications come the additional difficul-
ties of screening allegedly benign intent, as well as the unavoidable
threat of stigma.' 3
V. ADARAND AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICTLY SCRUTINIZING
RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
Perhaps the most universally understood principle of Adarand
is that strict scrutiny is now applicable to every government statute
or program, whether state or federal, which allocates burdens and
benefits on the basis of race. The impact is generally understood
that affirmative action legislation and programs will be more diffi-
cult to justify, and that the justification for such programs must be
to remedy the effects of past governmental discrimination. The
doctrinal purity and consistency of the Court's approach in
Adarand, which may serve to eliminate one or two class sessions
for constitutional law students, says nothing of its importance. The
true value of Adarand lies in its rejection of the dangerous prece-
dents established, albeit for a brief period, in Metro.
A. Diversity and Racial Balancing
In Metro, the Court did the unprecedented, announcing that the
FCC's goal of promoting broadcast diversity was a sufficiently
important interest to pass constitutional muster.'84 As the Court
has solidified a standard of strict scrutiny for all racial classifica-
182. Katz, supra note 4, at 325. Professor Katz's critique of the fate of the results in
affirmative action programs in favor of the economically disadvantaged as being "both an
historically and logically 'anomalous result,"' id. at 340, is even more difficult to under-
stand. Given this country's history and acceptance of social legislation in favor of the
economically disadvantaged, it is difficult to conceive why applying minimum level scruti-
ny to such legislation might be viewed as "anomalous."
183. See infra part V.B.
184. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-68 (1990).
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tions, it is unlikely that an interest in diversity will survive judicial
scrutiny in the near future." 5 However, it is worth examining the
negative aspects of sanctioning a governmental interest in diversity
as compelling or even important, should the delicate balance of the
Court shift once again.
In Metro, the importance of the FCC's and Congress's asserted
interest in diversity was clothed in the guise of serving "First
Amendment values.' 8 6 Nevertheless, as one author asserted,
"equal protection antidiscrimination concerns trump the first-amend-
ment diversity value."'8 7 If not generally evident, this principle is
particularly true with respect to the government's attempt to man-
date diversity of broadcasting. While the FCC programs at issue in
Metro directly conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee, eliminating the FCC programs would not have
directly interfered with the First Amendment's promise of free
speech.' 8 The First Amendment's command to Congress is nega-
tive-that it "shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech"--rather than a positive command to make some forum
available for speech.8 9
The government's interest in remedying the effects of identified
governmental discrimination, which has always been a sufficiently
compelling interest to permit explicit racial classifications, is readi-
ly distinguishable. When individuals have been denied equal protec-
tion of the law in the past, the government is viewed as having an
interest in, and perhaps even more so an obligation, to compensate
those individuals injured by government action itself.'"° When
government breaches its Fourteenth Amendment obligations to
some individuals, the diffuse burden visited on those other individ-
uals burdened by a racial classification is justified by the end.
The majority in Metro weighed the FCC programs against
Justice Powell's dicta in Bakke.'9' Justice Powell opined that the
185. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing the dangerous
effects of all racial preferences); Metro, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that broadcast diversity
was certainly not a compelling government interest).
186. 497 U.S. at 568.
187. Devins, supra note 40, at 148.
188. Id. at 148-49.
189. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
191. Metro, 497 U.S. at 568.
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University of California at Davis could constitutionally consider
race and ethnicity as one factor among many in its admissions
process, justified by its First Amendment interest in developing a
diversified student body."ra Justice O'Connor expressed a similar
sentiment several years later in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion.'93 The Metro majority attempted to assimilate broadcast di-
versity to educational diversity, arguing that not only did minorities
benefit from the FCC's ownership policies, but also that "benefits
redound to all members of the viewing and listening audience."'94
Nevertheless, it appears doubtful that today's Court would find an
interest in diversity, even in the limited context of education, suffi-
ciently compelling to justify explicit reference to race absent some
showing of past governmental discrimination.'
A principal objection to government's explicit use of racial
classifications, justified by nothing more than an asserted govern-
mental interest in promoting "diversity," is that the essence of
enforced diversity is a form of outright racial balancing. The weak
connection between the FCC's minority ownership policies and its
purported goal of increasing broadcast diversity in Metro suggests
that the FCC's true purpose was to increase minority ownership, or
in other words, "'racial balancing' of broadcast station owner-
ship. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
192. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (Powell, J.).
Although four other justices agreed with Justice Powell on this point, Justice Powell was
the only one of the five who applied strict scrutiny. See supra notes 18-27 and accom-
panying text.
193. 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting that "although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the
context of higher education").
194. Metro, 497 U.S. at 568. While such an argument, accepting Justice Powell's dicta
in Bakke, might justify the minority preference program at issue in Metro, it certainly
would not justify the FCC's distress sale program. See supra notes 60-63 and accompa-
nying text (describing the two FCC programs at issue in Metro). Justice Powell clearly
explained in Bakke that a quota program that completely excluded individuals from com-
petition on the basis of race was not narrowly tailored toward the goal of diversity.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-18. The FCC's distress sale program completely excluded non-
minority individuals from purchasing a class of broadcast stations, and to that extent was
the ultimate of quotas-100%. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
195. In Metro, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, opined that remedying the effects of identified past discrimination was the
only governmental interest that might justify the use of explicit racial classifications.
Metro, 497 U.S. at 612-13. Justice Thomas has renounced all affirmative action programs
as a brand of "racial paternalism." See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
196. Metro, 497 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
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tion,97 a school integration case, the Court expressly disapproved
of a goal requiring "any particular degree of racial balance or
mixing."'98 The repulsiveness of racial balancing at the hands of
government has been explained in these terms:
What is clear is that when government gets into the busi-
ness of identifying various communities and cultural group-
ings and manipulating their fortunes, it results in something
ugly, awkward, or trivial, like the FCC policies at issue [in
Metro]. As this is true of diversity in broadcasting, so it is
also true of diversity generally. In friendships, cultural ties,
and voluntary associations, a generous spirit seeks out
difference and variety. But forced on us by bureaucratic
command, this liberating impulse degenerates into what
Justice O'Connor rightly decried as impermissible stereotyp-
ing, tending not toward richness and difference at all, but
to a particularly leaden kind of uniformity, only seemingly
enlivened by what a mediocre officialdom counts as vari-
et,199ety.
Moreover, tolerance of racial balancing in the guise of diversity
could, ironically, eventually be used to exclude members of minori-
ty groups who are deemed to be overrepresented in a particular
social context.2"
Nevertheless, the greater harm of connecting thoughts, behavior,
and other attributes to race, in the name of promoting diversity, is
in reinforcing a traditional mode of thinking-that race makes a
difference in how individuals should regard one another."' In de-
scribing affirmative action programs as "racialist," or "racially
conscious,""2 2 Professor Stephen L. Carter explained the greater
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)).
197. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
198. Id. at 24.
199. Fried, supra note 64, at 121 (footnotes omitted).
200. Foster, supra note 143, at 133; see also Metro, 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the FCC's asserted interest in broadcast diversity "would justify
discrimination against members of any group found to contribute to an insufficiently di-
verse broadcasting spectrum, including those groups currently favored"). See, e.g., United
States v. Starett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1098 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting a housing
plan that limited the number of black tenants in an effort to maintain an integrated, ra-
cially balanced housing complex and to limit the effect of white flight).
201. See, e.g., Metro, 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the FCC
programs at issue in Metro for equating race with behavior).
202. Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 433
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societal harm of racially conscious thinking:
Once it is accepted that race can carry significance-a
point which is central to the case for racial consciousness
in remedial programs-the dispute may be reduced to one
over what race more rationally signifies: an education dis-
advantage that a just society will find ways to overcome,
or a tendency toward criminality that a just society will
avoid. The fact that one of the two choices seems morally
odious does not mean that no one could rationally conclude
that it is correct. The societal goal of preventing violent
crime seems just as worthy as the societal goal of eliminat-
ing the legacy of racial oppression. If the tools of racial
categorization can fairly be used for the second, it is no
easy matter to explain, to someone who believes them
helpful, why they cannot be used for the first. If all one
can say is, "You've got the statistics wrong," then the de-
gree of moral suasion is very slight. Thus the critic of
affirmative action programs is able to concede that racism
is a greater enemy than racialism, and yet point as well to
the risks involved in perpetuating racialism. A society
without racism is an excellent goal, the argument might
conclude; teaching that racial consciousness is wrong is a
vital step along the way."
B. The Myth of Benign Discrimination and the Reality of Stigma
A necessary assumption of the theory of "benign discrimina-
tion," and its accompanying relaxed standard of judicial review, is
that courts will be able to readily distinguish between benevolent
and malevolent governmental employment of racial classifications.
As Justice O'Connor skeptically remarked in Metro, "[h]istory
should teach greater humility."' When the Court makes a sur-
face-level inquiry and classifies legislation as benign, determining
that relaxed judicial scrutiny is appropriate, it undermines a funda-
(1988).
203. Id. at 434-35 (footnote omitted). Although the passage quoted from Professor
Carter's article addressed affirmative action programs that, although remedial, seek to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination, its import applies even more forcefully to
government programs grounded in nothing more than diversity. See also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "classifications
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic").
204. Metro, 497 U.S. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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mental purpose of judicial inquiry--"to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race," perhaps those "motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics. '25 In effect, the Court
assumes the answer before asking the question.
The crucial defect in the principle of scrutinizing benign racial
classifications less carefully is not only in its myopia, but more so
in its misunderstanding of the actual impact of government's so-
called benign racial classifications. No matter how benevolent and
admirable government's intent, affirmative action programs stigma-
tize their beneficiaries. 6 While some may argue that the benefits
justify the burden, an even more disastrous effect of affirmative
action programs is that they stigmatize not only their specific bene-
ficiaries, but the entire races that they purport to benefit.' They
create a disastrous impression that members of minority groups are
generally less intelligent, less qualified, and less able to make it on
their own.2"8
If it is accepted that affirmative action programs stigmatize
their beneficiaries, it is irrelevant who is to blame for the harm.
Despite government's best intentions, the entire concept of benign
racial classifications is turned on its head. In an insightful criticism
of the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis2" and its doctrine
requiring proof of discriminatory legislative intent for facially neu-
tral, disparate racial impact classifications,21 Professor Charles
Lawrence III observed that,
If stigmatizing actions injure by virtue of the meaning
society gives them, then it should be apparent that the evil
intent of their authors, while perhaps sufficient, is not
necessary to the infliction of the injury. For example, a
well-meaning if misguided white employer, having observed
that her black employees usually sat together at lunch,
might build a separate dining room for them with the in-
205. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
206. See, e.g., Linda Chavez, Racial Justice: Changing the Tune, LEGAL TIMES, Dec.
26, 1994, at 18, 28 (reporting the resentment that affirmative action programs evoke
among whites, and the stigma felt by the beneficiaries).
207. Foster, supra note 143, at 145-46 (noting the reported stigma felt by members of
minority racial and ethnic groups on college campuses).
208. Id. at 145-46 (observing that Blacks and Hispanics are often viewed as "less intel-
ligent than 'regular admits' on college campuses).
209. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
210. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318 (1987).
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tent of making them more comfortable. This action would
stigmatize her black employees despite her best inten-
tions."
It is apparent then that what is important in evaluating affirma-
five action legislation is the actual effects of such programs, and
not the "benign" intent of government. If the intent of government
is invidiously discriminatory, then stigma attaches. However, if the
intent of government is benign and stigma still attaches, the song
remains the same.
One author has argued that the stigma argument is inconsistent
with individual rights theory.212 If stigma attaches to the group as
a result of affirmative action legislation, the argument goes, then it
is a result of group-based thinking that affirmative action did not
create."' While affirmative action certainly is not the originator
of group-based thinking, it is the cause of group-based thinking in
the contexts in which stigma results. For example, suppose a well-
known government program favored persons with green eyes.
When a person with green eyes was hired, promoted, awarded a
government contract, or granted admission to a university, whether
as a result of the program or not, an unavoidable assumption of
the preference outsiders (those without green eyes) would be that
the characteristic, green eyes, and not merit, was the reason for the
favorable action.
On the other hand, if a person with green eyes was awarded
some preference because a background inquiry revealed economic
disadvantage, and thus greater merit than another with identical
qualifications,214 it would be ludicrous to assume that the green
eyes made the difference. In other words, no stigma attaches.
Green eyes have no independent significance, and even if the effect
of the preference for the economically disadvantaged is discovered,
no stigma attaches in that the preference is based on relative merit.
That the economic disadvantage might have been in some measure
a result of the individual's having been born with green eyes does
not shift the emphasis to the individual's green eyes. In other
words, it is the affirmative action program itself that reinforces
211. Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted).
212. See supra part IV.A for explication of the individual rights theory.
213. Morrison, supra note 156, at 342-43.
214. The assumption-of greater merit is based on the concept of relative merit, which
emphasizes efforts, rather than absolute merit, which emphasizes results. See supra notes
156-58 and accompanying text.
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
group-based thinking.
VI. CONCLUSION
"[E]ven though affirmative action's supporters are at best rela-
tively insignificant purveyors of racialist thought in America, the
criticism is still on the mark: The programs do rely on racialist
categorization, and thus do work to perpetuate the idea that skin
color carries significance."
215
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena represents more than a
consolidation of equal protection race-based classification analysis.
It signifies a shift from group-based thinking to a focus on the
constitutional rights of individuals, and an acknowledgement that
racial classifications are rarely related to legitimate government
goals. It also represents a rejection of the legitimacy of racial bal-
ancing by government, and the idea that legislation may be classi-
fied as "benign" without a thorough examination of its effects.
Adarand is not and should not be viewed as a death knell for
all affirmative action programs. So long as such programs are
narrowly tailored to address identified governmental discrimination
against minorities, they should survive strict scrutiny. However,
insofar as race-based legislation will certainly be more difficult to
justify, Adarand may properly require Congress to shift its focus to
helping disadvantaged minorities and non-minorities alike, without
reference to their race. In that respect, Adarand may be viewed as
a positive step toward government in which race carries no inde-
pendent significance-government in which all persons truly are
equal in the eyes of the law. While colorblind government may
still be a goal for the future, Adarand is at least a step in the right
direction.
STEPHEN C. MINNICH
215. Carter, supra note 202, at 436.
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